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According to the Catholic tradition, on the contrary, the source of moral evil is
precisely the intrinsic direction of the will. A Christian knows that adultery is
committed in the heart even if nothing external has a hair 's chance of occurring,
and that blasphemy is wrong even though there is, and can be , no direct external
effect. That is to say, moral evil consists primarily in the will 's repudiation of a
basic good or value. Thus in the (rare) abortion case , for example, where the
choice is between directly killing one or letting both die, we are obliged not to
kill, because the external results are of a different order from that of the interior
act of will directed against an innocent human life. The interior act of will constitutes a person's deciding for or against the objective order of goodness or value
established by God Himself. Direct killing can be justified only as defense of self
or others against unjust aggressors . Only purposeful aggression makes a person not
innocent and thus deprived of the right not to be killed directly. If someone's life
endangers the safety of others, through no purposeful act of his own, e.g., because
he is diseased or because a foreign country threatens to kill hostages if he is not
killed, such a person still cannot be justly killed . Innocent human life (innocent in
the sense just explained, and not in a mere causal sense) is inviolable.
- Patrick Lee , Ph.D.
St. Francis de Sales ColIege

Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology
Charles E. Curran
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind. , 1979. $11.95 (hard cover),
$4. 95 (soft cover).
People may disagree with Father Charles Curran's approach to Catholic moral
theology. They may even argue, as he admits, that he has incorporated so much
transition into his moral thinking that he has abandoned the Catholic tradition.
But everyone knows where he stands. His new volume , Transition and Tradition in
Moral Th eology, once more records his opinions cl early, forthrightly, and
persuasively , for whatever they may be worth.
In this volume he has skillfully joined nine separate essays prepared for various
occasions into one volume, with admirable continuity and consistency. The nine
essays fall neatly into three parts with three chapters each.
Part one co nsiders general moral theology with an overview chapter and
separate chapters on contraception and homosex uality . He maintains an even and
calm style broken by occasional sweeping statements.
As examples of the latter, co nsider these three bold and au thoritative
statements:
"There can be no doubt in the light of the histor ical circumstanc es that the
official imposition of Thomism was an attempt to prevent any dialogue with the
contemporary world and its thought patterns" (p. 12).
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"The teaching condemning artificial contraception is wrong ; the pope is in
error" (p. 46).
"For an irreversible or constitutional homosexual, homosexual acts in the
context of a loving relationship striving for permanency can be and are morally
good" (p. 71).
Part two shifts gears completely to consider social justice. It opens with a
historical chapter on "American Catholic Social Ethics, 1880-1965." Then follows
a chapter entitled "Social Ethics: Future Agenda for Theology and the Church,"
Father Curran 's contribution to the Notre Dame symposium looking ahead to
Vatican III.
The final chapte r of part two offers a useful and carefully outlined introduction to the complex question of the right to health care. It argues for a basis in
distributive rather than equalitarian justice , and carefully distinguishes the right to
health care necessary for decent human living from a spurious and utopian right to
health as envisioned by the World Health Organization.
Part three opens with a history of Roman Catholic medical ethics which Father
Curran believes is unique in printed literature. He points to it as substantiation of
his concern for tradition. However, in the last three pages of this well-written and
concise history, he notes the n'e w approaches to natural law and the teaching
authority of the Church which he employs. His critics would suggest that these
new approaches relegate the tradition to a past with a radically different present
and future.
In the remaining two chapters of part three, Father Curran considers abortion - first its ethical aspects and then legal and public funding aspects. In his
review of the difficult issue of the value and rights of the fetus, he espouses the
theory of ensoulment at two or three weeks after conception. He does not follow
the teaching of the 1974 Vatican Declaration on Abortion that theories of
delayed ensoulme nt should not modify one's moral stand on abortion. Thus he
"accepts a few more abortions than the official Catholic teaching on the double
effect" (p. 227). He does not cite the impressive philosophical argument against
delayed ensoulment by Benedict Ashley , O.P. in the appendix to the task force
study of the Pope John Center: An Ethical Analysis of Fetal Experimentation (St .
Louis, Mo., 1976).
Father Curran opposes a U.S. constitutional amendment to protect the fetus
because he wishes to preserve as much freedom and provide as little constraint as
possible for pregnant women . He wishes there were a better way than public funding for abortions for the poor, but he concludes , "If I am faced with such a
dilemma, I would reluctantly accept the public funding of elective abortions for
the poor " (p. 248). He even creates a ne w category of right in his discussion of
this public funding, "the existential right to an abortion" (p. 246).
As Father Curran advances his opinions throughout the book, he makes it clear
that there are opponents to his various opinions and he reviews their reasons
briefly and fairly . However , those who support Church teaching on critical issues
like contraception, homosexuality, and abortion will not find a very thorough
analysis of their theological position. Even Father Curran 's advocacy of his own
opinions is accomplished more by footnote references than by thorough and
in-depth analysis.
However , Father Curran 's views which dissent from Catholic teaching generally
rely on two basic themes: his accusation of physicalism in traditional magisterial
teaching and his support for a new moral methodology. Each of these themes will
be discussed in the remainder of this review.
He uses the accusation of physicalism in Church teaching to justify his dissenting position on contraception and even cites it as relevant to other issues of
human sexuality, to abortion and euthanasia, and even to divorce and remarriage.
The traditional Catholic stress on maintaining the physical integrity of conjugal

374

Linacre Quarterly

intercourse and on respecting human life from the physical moment of conception
disturbs Father Curran because he fears it is a one-sided approach to the person.
His opponents, on the other hand, can rightly insist that human life and love do
involve the physical realm as a necessary and indispensable, even if incomplete,
aspect of the person whose reality is equally physical and spiritual.
Father Curran does not hesitate to justify the contraceptive elimination of the
procreative potential from conjugal intercourse because he judges it to be only a
physical element of the act. He does not even consider the action of eliminating
procreativity a physical evil but merely a sequel to human finitude. Those
responding to the author would insist that human fre edom , like human love, is
anchored in the fleshy reality of the person. Hence the Church teaches that
responsible persons, freely expressing conjugal love, cannot deny or suppress its
physical procreativity but must cherish it and incorporate it reverently and
responsibly into the loving context of their complete inter-personal relationship.
In other words, it can b e argued that while conjugal love is by no m eans a
merely physical activity, to destroy t he integrity of its physical expression is to
destroy a constitutive element of its humanity. In this sense the contraceptive act
is a dehumanized and even a depersonalized act. Considered in this light, Father
Curran's argument against physicalism leads to a Platonic dualism and spiritualism
whereas the Church teac hing reflects an incarnational view of the human person.
With regard to the author's second theme - his support for a new moral
methodology - it must first be noted that he recognizes that the new methodological approaches are only in the;r incipient stages and need to be developed and
ex plored systematically (p . 202). Yet he uses one of these methods to justify his
adamant dissent from Church teaching.
Secondly, he ties the new approaches in moral methodology to what is called
the disintegration of perennial philosophy (p . xi). Yet a climate of philosophical
eclecticism is no basis for a sound and reliable moral theology. Furthermore, the
perennial Christian theology of the person is not tied uniquely and exclusively to
the Aristotelian-Thomistic perennial philosophy. Pope John Paul II, for example,
has not adopted a new moral methodology although he uses a contemporary
Christian theology of the person. Father Curran's advocacy of new moral methodologies seems to imply that the unpopularity of the perennial philosophy opens
moral theology to the same range of competing methodologies as a variety of
schools of philosophical ethics. The task is to find which philosophical methodologies are applicable to the Christian theology of the person.
Father Curran is in basic agreement with the methodology of ethical proportionalism (p. 37). He applies it more literally in his teaching on homosexuality
than on contracept ion since he does not concede even physical evil in the latter
case. He concedes physical evil in homosexual activity but can admit situations in
which the activity becomes morally good . This supposes a concept of the human
person as someone who is able to turn evil into good by certain good dispositions,
provided the person's personality is homosexually-oriented.
This methodology is significantly different from the approach in trad itional
Church teaching which holds that a homosexual person may be inculpable for
individual acts of homosexuality because of ignorance or passion / compu lsion .
This methodology holds that evil has actually become good by the proportionately greater values certain individuals may achieve , outwe ighing the disvalues of
the otherwise evi l act.
Once again, physicalism enters this analysis. The physical evil of homosexual
activity is dismissed because of compensating values. The implicit view of the
human person here, as in the contraceptive issue, subordinates the physical order
of human sexuality to other values experienced by individual persons. Yet in the
Church's theology of the human person the physical order of human sexuality
cannot be relegated to a realm separate from personal values , nor can it be sub-
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jected to an autonomous constitution of meaning and value from free choice. The
Church has taught that the normative meaning of human sexuality is rooted in the
very being of human persons and does not await the value calculus of individuals
to be established. The ultimate issue is whether incarnate human persons can
stand outside their own sexual constitution and change its inherent meaning by
willing it so.
Hence the rejection of physicalism and the acceptance of ethical proportionalism in matters of human sexuality seem to imply a theology of the person and
human sexuality at variance with doctrinal teaching as well as moral teaching.
These are profound theological concerns which lie beneath the surface of Father
Curran's dissent from magisterial teaching.
Until these concerns are resolved, this reviewer can understand why the dissenting theolgians must expect continued resistance to their opinions from magisterial
teachers, even when the opinions are presented as persuasively and confidently as
Father Curran presents his.
- Rev. Donald G. McCarthy

Teaching Bioethics:
Strategies, Problems and Resources
K. Danner Clouser
The Hastings Center, Hastings-an-Hudson, N. Y., 1980. xi + 77 pp., $4.00 (soft
cover).
This book is the fourth of a series of nine monographs on the teaching of ethics
from the Hastings Center Project on the Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education, a
two-year project supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New
York and co-directed by Daniel Callahan and Sissela Bok.
K. Danner Clouser's contribution deals with the teaching of bioethics. Other
monographs in the series deal with the teaching of ethics in graduate schools of
law, journalism, business, engineering, and social studies, as well as in the undergraduate curriculum.
Clouser is well known in the field of bioethics and writes from a background of
Lu t heran theology, Ivy League studies and teaching, and a dozen years of teaching
me dical ethics at the Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine at
Hershey .
Only someone with Clouser's skills and qualifications could sensibly approach
the well-nigh impossible task of writing a book on how to teach medical ethics in
our contemporary pluralistic and largely materialistic society. He does it with a
foot-work and a finesse that seldom seem to skip even a step. Clouser himself
recognizes the problems involved in such a task.
By way of a method to approach the problems, he sketches a paradigm of
teaching bioethics to medical students and using this as a baseline, rings in the
"mutatis mutandis" for other biomedical settings and in this way, he says, he
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